25-08-2025, 12:16 PM
Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan is the cornerstone of equality in Pakistani Law. It states simply, that all citizens are equal before the law and entitled to its equal protection; no one shall be discriminated against on the basis of sex alone; and the State may adopt special measures for the protection of women and children.
The first clause, declaring that all citizens are equal before the law, has been central to constitutional litigation. When interpreted, equality here does not mean that everyone must be treated in exactly the same way, regardless of circumstances. Rather, it requires that any difference in treatment must be based on a fair and rational principle. Additionally, In I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041), the Supreme Court explained two major points on which the constitutionality of a law with respect to equality may be determined:
1) Intelligible Differentia: a clear and reasonable distinction that separates one group of citizens from another
2) Rational Nexus: a rational purpose that is essential to the purpose of the law
To summarize, the State must be able to explain both why it has drawn a distinction and how that distinction furthers the law’s objective. If either element is missing, the classification is arbitrary and violates Article 25.
The second clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender, while the third allows protective provisions for women and children. Together, these clauses reflect a move from mere formal equality to substantive justice. The Constitution recognizes that some groups, due to historical and social disadvantages, may require special treatment to achieve genuine fairness. Courts have generally upheld such affirmative measures as compatible with Article 25, so long as they are proportional and directed toward legitimate aims.
To understand this better, we look at the case of Shirin Munir v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1990 SC 295) the Court examined whether gender-based distinctions under the Constitution could ever be justified. It explained that such distinctions are acceptable only when they are reasonable and serve a clear purpose, like maintaining single-gender schools. But in the case of medical colleges, using quotas to limit women’s access was found unconstitutional. Since most colleges were already co-educational, these restrictions were not protective but discriminatory. The Court stressed that giving preference to less qualified men over capable women violated equality, and it ruled that women must also be allowed to compete freely for open merit seats. The Supreme Court struck down arbitrary preferences in educational admissions based on gender, affirming that the State may not draw distinctions without reasonable basis.
Rights and Citizenship
A crucial feature of Article 25 is its repeated reference to “citizens.” The Constitution frequently distinguishes between rights available to every “person” and those reserved for “citizens.” Rights such as life (Article 9), dignity (Article 14), and fair trial (Article 10A) extend to all persons, which includes foreigners and even juristic entities such as corporations. By contrast, rights like freedom of movement, association, and equality under Article 25 are restricted to citizens. The Constitution itself does not define the term, but Article 260 directs us to statutory law, where the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 defines a citizen is one who acquires nationality by birth, descent, migration at partition, or naturalisation. Citizenship is therefore a legal status, determined by law, that decides who may invoke Article 25.
The implications of this distinction for corporations were drawn out in detail by the Islamabad High Court in PTA v. Pakistan Information Commission (2024 YLR 929). The Court noted that while corporations are legal “persons” capable of holding many rights, they are not citizens. As such, they cannot claim rights explicitly reserved for citizens, such as access to information under Article 19A. This shows that the most civil political rights remain tied to citizenship.
At the same time, PLD 2022 Lahore 756 shows the applicability of Article 25 to a non-citizen person. The Lahore High Court dealt with the arbitrary blocking of a citizen’s computerized national identity card (CNIC). This prevented the individual from functioning in society: banking, travel, and even everyday transactions become impossible. The Court held that cutting off a CNIC without lawful authority effectively strips a citizen of the equal protection guaranteed by Article 25, reducing him to a status less than that of his peers. The court held that equality before the law is meaningless if citizenship itself can be undermined by executive, and that fundamental rights in Articles 8-28 must be granted to all citizens, equally.
Read together, these cases illustrate that Article 25 functions on two levels. It affirms equality as a shield against arbitrary state action, ensuring that no citizen is deprived of rights or status without lawful justification. At the same time, it draws a boundary between citizens and non-citizens, reserving the fullest constitutional protections for those who legally belong to the State.
Essentially, Article 25 equips the courts with a test to strike down unfair distinctions. While it is still a vastly developing jurisprudence, the open-endedness of the Article makes room for an aspiration- equal opportunity for everyone.